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ABSTRACT

What are the challenges facing the protection of traditional knowledge
internationally? Can the protection of such rights, which have traditionally existed
outside the boundaries of intellectual property, be achieved in the face of current
challenges to protections epitomized by such emerging international movements as
enhanced access to information and culture as a human right? This article examines
some of the emerging issues in this hotly contested area and suggests that such
movements, which are not adverse to intellectual property and traditional knowledge
rights, should be used to craft a new method for addressing the issue of traditional
knowledge protection internationally.
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TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE FIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
DORIS ESTELLE LONG*

Sixty-five years ago, when The John Marshall Law School first started its
Center for Intellectual Property1 , there was "traditional knowledge." Sixty-five years
from now, there will still be "traditional knowledge" at John Marshall's Center for
Intellectual Property. Between these two dates, it would be nice if better protection
for such knowledge could be developed.
Some of the more recent difficulties associated with extending harmonized
international protection to so-called traditional knowledge have focused on the
critical issue of the relationship between traditional knowledge protection and
intellectual property. This is represented largely in debates over domestic public
policy choices governing economic, educational and commercial development, the
2
scope of the public domain, and public access to "information" and "expression."

* Doris Estelle Long is a Professor and Chair of the Intellectual Property, Information
Technology and Privacy Group at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. This article is
based on her presentation given on May 25, 2006, at The John Marshall Law School's 50th Annual
Conference of Developments in Intellectual Property Law and the 65th Anniversary of The John
Marshall Center for Intellectual Property Law, entitled, "The Role of the United States in World
Intellectual Property Law." Professor Long would like to thank Tamar Schiller for her invaluable
research assistance in connection with portions of this article.
She would also like to thank the
various sponsors and participants at the following workshops and conferences where diverse aspects
of the issues addressed in this article were discussed, including: The Yale Law School Access to
Knowledge Conference; The Third Annual Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program
Symposium at Michigan State University College of Law; the Ninth Annual Conference of the
Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities at Syracuse University College of
Law; the Conference on Creative Processes and the Public Domain at The John Marshall Law
School; The John Marshall Faculty Works in Progress Workshop; The Inaugural Meeting of the
Working Group on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurism; and the Conference on
Intellectual Property, Sustainable Development and Endangered Species:
Understanding the
Dynamics of the Information Ecosystem at Michigan State University College of Law.
I Soo generally The John Marshall Law School, Intellectual Property Law Center,
http://www.jmls.edu/academics/ip-law/ip-center main.shtml (last visited July 5, 2006).
2 See generally CPTech: Access to Knowledge, http://www.cptech.org/a2k/ (last visited July 5,
2006); James D. Nason, TraditionalProperty and Modern Laws: The Need for Native American
Community Intellectual Property Rights Legislation, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 255 (2001); Molly
Torsen, 'Anonymous, Untitled, Mixed Media": Mixing IntellectualProperty Law With Other Legal
Philosophies To Protect TraditionalCulturalExpressions, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 287 (2006); Paul
Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisalof the
Tensions Between Individual and Communal Right in Africa and the United States, 48 AM.U. L.
REV. 769 (1999); WIPO, IDENTIFYING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS, WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (2001) [hereinafter WIPO, NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS];
MICHAEL BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE ART (Harvard University Press) (2003); Doris Estelle Long,
"Globalization":A Future Trend or a Satisfying Mirage, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 313 (2001)
[hereinafter Long, "Globalization"];Erica-Irene Daes, Study in the Protection of the Cultural and
Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination
of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (1993); Angela Riley, Straight Stealing: Towards an
Indigenous System of Cultural Property, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69 (2005); Peter Drahos, Towards an
InternationalFrameworkfor the Protection of TraditionalGroup Knowledge and Practice,Feb. 2-4,
2004, http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/PDFs/Drahos-tkframework.pdf.
Rekha Ramani, Note and

[5:317 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

Today, there tends to be one group who believes that traditional knowledge falls
outside the scope of any form of legal protection, including, particularly, any sui
generis protection based on modified intellectual property principles.
These
individuals further suggest that if any such rights exist, the holders should give up
such rights, usually for the benefit of society at large. Finally, they affirm that
traditional knowledge, however defined, resides firmly in the public domain. A
second group maintains that generational (traditional) knowledge, particularly
where such knowledge represents the culture and traditions of an identifiable
3
indigenous group, is entitled to protection, and, more importantly, to control.
Before going any further I want to define a few terms. There is no agreed upon
definition for the concepts of "traditional knowledge" or "traditional cultural
expressions," which is the copyright related subset of traditional knowledge.
"Traditional knowledge" at its broadest meaning covers a potentially large body of
knowledge and practices, which have been handed down through generations. This
includes a wide variety of spiritual and cultural beliefs and practices, tangible works,
folklore, folk art, folk remedies, etc. 4 The traditional knowledge based movements in
other fora, such as WIPO, recognize that separate treatment may be required for
those works, which represent indigenous creativity, such as folk lore, art, remedies,
and rituals.
Hence, a subcategory of traditional knowledge was developed:
5
traditional cultural expressions.
Because the protection of access to genetic information is part of another panel, I
will focus largely on the creative aspects of traditional knowledge, often referred to
Comment: Market Realities v. Indigenous Equities, 26 BROOK. J.

INT'L L. 1147 (2001); TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - ISSUES AND OPTIONS SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION

OF

TRADITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE

(The

http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/tkcol3.pdf

Quaker

United

Nations

Office

2000),

(last visited Oct. 6, 2004); Michael Blakeney, WIPO,

What Is Traditional Knowledge? Why Should It Be Protected? Who Should Protect It? For Whom?:
Understanding the Value Chain - Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge,
Geneva,
Nov.
1-2,
1999,
WIPO/IPTK/RT/99/3
(Oct.
6,
1999),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/folklore/pdf/tkrt99-3.pdf
[hereinafter
WIPO
Forum on Intellectual Property]; WIPO, INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: OUR IDENTITY, OUR FUTURE," INFORMATION NOTE ON TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE (2002) [hereinafter WIPO, INTERNATIONAL FORUM]; WIPO, THE ATTEMPT TO PROTECT
EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (2001) [hereinafter WIPO, ATTEMPT TO
PROTECT EXPRESSION]; KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter Lang) (2001); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (New
York Univ. Press) (2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY

AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (Penguin Press) (2004);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyrighit and Cultural
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Bradford Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional
Knowledge: A PsychologicalApproach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in InternationalLaw, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613 (2005).
See generally,Nason, supranote 2; Torsen, supra note 2; Kuruk, supra note 2; WIPO, NEEDS
AND EXPECTATIONS, supra note 2; Brown, supra note 2; Long, supra note 2; Daes, supra note 2;
Riley, supra note 2; Drahos, supra note 2; Ramani, supra note 2; Correa, supra note 2; Blakeney,
supra note 2.
See generallyWIPO, NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS, supra note 2; Brown, supra note 2; Long,
supra note 2; Daes, supra note 2; Riley, supra note 2; Drahos, supra note 2; Ramani, supra note 2;
Correa, supra note 2; Blakeney, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., WIPO, INTERNATIONAL FORUM, supra note 2; WIPO, ATTEMPT TO PROTECT
EXPRESSIONS, supra note 2.
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currently as TCEs, although many of my comments have equal applicability in the
broader area of traditional knowledge itself.
The title of this conference is "The Role of the United States in International
Intellectual Property Law." While preparing my comments for this presentation, in
response to the conference's title, I considered the fight over traditional knowledge,
and said, "Okay, there's an easy answer to that one." If you were to ask me what the
role of the United States is in the protection of the traditional knowledge, I would
essentially say "not a whole lot."
However, if you think about the subject as broader than simply support for the
rights of indigenous peoples to control their traditional knowledge, and include
consideration of who is entitled access to, and use of, the various types of information
subsumed in the category of "traditional knowledge," then the role of the United
States is much broader. More specifically, when referring to the "United States," I
am including U.S. scholars, along with agencies and representatives of the United
States Government. From this perspective, the impact may be broader than my
initial skepticism.
In particular, I want to focus my remarks on the increasing scholarly dialogues
6
about access to knowledge and information. When considering access to expression
and information, cultural commentators in the various debates over the relationship
of copyright to culture protection generally conclude that copyright protection should
be less strong, so that other people can freely use the works at issue.7 Looking at
such conclusions, one might think that, on the surface, they are in contradistinction
to the idea of providing heightened protection for traditional knowledge.
With respect to the Draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge ("Draft A2-K")8, it is
inconsistent in its discussion of traditional knowledge. Draft A2-K seeks generally to
expand public access to creative and innovative works, and to strike a balance
between traditional intellectual property rights under copyright and patent (among
others) and the enhanced informational demands of the Digital Age. However, it
currently contains no section that directly addresses or even acknowledges the rights
of indigenous peoples to participate in their culture through the critical rights of self
determination or any other form of control.
Despite an acknowledgement in the preamble that among the purposes of Draft
A2-K is to enhance "cultural affairs," the treatment of traditional knowledge is
inconsistent. While Article 4-1, which deals with patents, recognizes the traditional
knowledge based right of equitable benefit sharing for biologics, 9 Article 3-7 appears
to prevent any protection for the cultural expression side of traditional knowledge,
which includes folklore and folk art. Article 3-7 contains language that basically

6I am using the term "expression" to refer to materials, which are potentially subject to
copyright protection, and therefore, protectable within the scope of such protection. Although the
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a statutory, and definable, distinction between
protectable "expression under copyright and unprotected "information." See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 102.
7 Soo, e.g., McLeod, supra note 2; Vaidhyanathan, supra note 2; Lessig, supra note 2; Arewa,
supra note 2; Simon, supra note 2.
8
See
Treaty
on
Access
to
Knowledge
(Draft)
(2005),
http ://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf [hereinafter Draft A2-K].
Draft A2-K, supranote 9, at art. 4-1.
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prohibits any protection for works lacking in creativity. It states: "[Wiorks lacking in
creativity should not be subject to copyright or copyright-like protections." 10
Thankfully, Article 3 does not define "creativity," which at least allows for some
flexibility in Draft A2-K's apparent condemnation of TCE protection. Draft A2-K's
language seems to clearly indicate that if one is on the folklore, or folk art side of
traditional knowledge, one does not fit within present copyright regimes.1 1 However,
Draft A2-K is not necessarily at loggerheads with traditional knowledge protection.
To the contrary, the two movements have a lot to say to each other.
Both the access to knowledge and traditional knowledge movements have, at
their core, a fundamental goal of creating greater flexibility in intellectual property
rights regimes. They can take a lot of information from each other. Moreover,
allowing the two movements to inform, as opposed to contradict, each other may
ultimately develop a stronger and fairer system - one that allows access, recognizes
welfare benefits, and allows the development of new technology and all of the new
works one wants. Such a system could still recognize the rights of indigenous peoples
to control their culture and to self-determination when it comes to what aspects of
their knowledge and culture may be used by third parties and under what conditions.
When people talk about the public domain, which is all the time, the discussions
are no more monolithic than is the public domain itself.12 In fact, as one moves to
different areas of discussion regarding the role of the public domain, the concept of
"public domain" loses its meaning. Consider the following discussions of what
qualifies as the "public domain" (and why) in the following debates about access to
knowledge and the public domain: Culture Industries and Economic Growth; Culture
as a Human Right; the Determination of the Boundaries of the "Commons"; and the
Overarching Goal of Bringing the Benefits of Innovation to Your Neighborhood.
Each such example might well require a very different approach and a different
balance to be struck between protection and access.
One of the interesting things in talking to indigenous peoples about the public
domain is the response they provide. The concept of the public domain does not
currently exist in many indigenous communities except in the form of "your public
domain" versus "my cultural heritage." When asked, indigenous peoples often
respond with the same question. "How come 'public domain' is my stuff?. Yours is
copyrightable and mine is in the public domain. How did that happen?" The answer,
of course, is that we have developed a nice approach to protection. New works get
protected. Their works have been around too long. 13 Therefore, we all get to use
them.14

10 Id. at art. 3-7.
" TCE usually lacks either an identifiable author and/or has been in existence beyond the
period of most copyright terms of protection.
12 For an excellent early discussion of the nature and value of the public domain, see Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). Soo also Yochai Benkler, Through the
Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public
Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Kimberly Christen, Gone Digital.*Aboriginal Romix and the
CulturalCommons, 12 INT'L JOURNAL OF CULTURAL PROP. 315 (2005).
13 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised July 24, 1971, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs woOO1.html [hereinafter Berne Convention] (noting
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When people are dealing with traditional knowledge, admittedly, definitions are
hard to create. However, what remains consistent with traditional knowledge, no
matter what definition is used, is that it focuses on innovation, culture, and works
that have been passed through generations.
If knowledge is passed through
generations from the Western copyright point of view, that knowledge is in the public
domain. Yet, there is value in that generational passage and in the knowledge that
has been perfected by such controlled transmission.
I think one of the greatest misconceptions people have about traditional
knowledge is the mistaken notion that traditional knowledge means protecting the
things that grandma did so that they never change. It is true that traditional
knowledge is focused on a particular group in such a way that there is a cultural
identification between the group and the knowledge at issue. Traditional knowledge,
however, also changes in response to culture, environment, and the passage of time.
It is a living active concept, and not just the snapshot of what used to be done back in
the good old days.
There is no question that if protection for traditional knowledge is actually
provided, some of the things that people think belong in the public domain, however
one defines it, are going to receive protection and be removed from the public domain.
People will not receive unimpeded access to certain items. In some instances, people
will get no access at all. In others, people will get limited access and maybe limited
rights. It will all depend on the type of traditional knowledge at issue, and the
importance of that particular traditional knowledge to the relevant holder.
What we should be looking for is nuanced protection, and not hard and fast
rules, the application of which would realistically change from group to group. In
fact, such rules may well change from item to item, depending on the type of
traditional knowledge to be protected, and the goals of such protection. What the
access-to-knowledge-movement has in common with the traditional-knowledgeprotection-movement is the idea of flexibility in the rules, and not the notion that any
copyright concept is drawn as an immovable line in the sand.
The conflict between access to knowledge, traditional knowledge, and IP regimes
is not as contradictory as it appears on its surface. Copyright has never had the
inflexibility of which it is often accused simply because it has always had fair-use to
mitigate against such inflexibility. 15 Therefore, no immutable line in the sand
actually exists. More importantly, all these areas share a growing awareness that
more flexibility is needed as the boundaries of protection for traditional knowledge
that international copyright protection only lasts for the life of the author, plus fifty years). Some
domestic laws provide for longer protection. See, e.g., 17 USC § 302 (noting copyright protection
currently lasts for life of the author plus seventy years, or a maximum term of ninety years when no
human author exists). See also European Union Copyright Term Directive, art. 1 (recognizing that
copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years for most works). None of these terms,
however, are long enough to save most traditional knowledge from being defaulted into the public
domain.
11Once a work's term of copyright protection has expired, it automatically becomes part of the
public domain and freely available for all to use.
1e
geenerally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). For an explanation of some of the nuances of fair use
as applied currently by U.S. courts see generally,Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985), Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003), Acuff-Rose v. Campbell, No. 91-5232, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6094 (6th Cir. April 1, 1991), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984).
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and other potentially protected works are established in the 21st Century. Instead of
reducing the debate to rhetoric over hard and fast rules, more issues need to be put
into the mix while deciding where those boundaries are going to be located. I am not
necessarily saying traditional knowledge should get the same property protections as
copyright and other forms of traditional intellectual property. To the contrary,
certain types of traditional knowledge will require differing levels of protection that
are achieved through more diverse mechanisms than pure property protection. The
bottom line is that the idea of exclusivity has to give way to a broader discussion of
what factors get put into the pot in order to determine the scope of protection
traditional knowledge will receive.
While the current international approach to traditional knowledge has been to
divide knowledge into the broad categories of traditional cultural expressions and
traditional knowledge (generally meaning scientific and agricultural practices and
innovations), this categorical division does not adequately address all of the variables
that must be added into the traditional knowledge mix. Traditional knowledge in the
form of folklore and folk art requires a different type of protection than traditional
knowledge in the form of folk medicine and folk remedies. 16 Public necessity alone
may justify different international regimes. Such differing regimes assure both
adequate access, and fair representation of the rights of the indigenous people to
control their culture and its use by others. There are some types of traditional
knowledge where sharing, or commercialization, is acceptable to the traditional
knowledge holder. Where commercial exploitation is acceptable, receipt of equitable
benefits from what others earn from the group's traditional knowledge may be
sufficient to meet the needs of both access and fairness. Aside from considerations of
fairness, such equitable benefit sharing also allows indigenous peoples to improve
their livelihood by building schools, roads, or whatever else they want to do with the
monies earned from the commercialization of their traditional knowledge, ultimately
allowing indigenous peoples to use their traditional knowledge to fuel their own
economic independence.
Similarly, traditional knowledge in the form of folklore and folk art deserves a
different level of protection than that of sacred traditional knowledge. Generally,
indigenous groups are not willing to have their sacred traditional knowledge
commercialized. Others may be willing to let people know about some of their sacred
practices, but would be unwilling to allow others to use, market, or share it.17 Such

61For a more detailed discussion of the variables influencing the level of protection for the
diverse forms of TK at issue, see generally Doris Estelle Long, Traditional Knowledge and Data
Access Demands: Untying the Gordian Knot, Presentation at Yale Access to Knowledge Conference,
(2006), available at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid
=1754. See also WIPO, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE: SUMMARY
OF ISSUES RAISED AND POINTS MADE (2006); WIPO, THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURAL
EXPRESSIONS/EXPRESSIONS OF FOLKLORE: REVISED OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES (2005); WIPO,
THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: OUTLINE OF POLICY OPTIONS AND LEGAL ELEMENTS

(2004); Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: A TRIPS Compatible
Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137 (2005); WIPO, GENETIC RESOURCES: DRAFT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS AND EQUITABLE BENEFIT SHARING (2004).
17 See, e.g., Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481 (Austl.). The practice
of certain indigenous groups in Australia is to allow the sale of sacred morning star poles to
museums for public display for educational purposes.
Id. Commercialization beyond such
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differential treatment requires a far different protection regime than one that merely
affords assurances of adequate compensation for the rights-holder.
Considerations governing the protection of sacred and exploitable traditional
knowledge in turn are far different from those where proper authentication may be
the sole concern. For example, from the standpoint of an indigenous group,
authentication may take the form of: "If you want to sell this, do not hold it out as
traditional Maori-made if it is in fact not Maori-made, or if it is not made in
accordance with our symbols and our traditions." I think the authentication issue
may be easier once the authentication provider is determined. However, that
question itself raises some interesting problems that are, unfortunately, beyond the
18
scope of this article.
I get nervous when people talk about traditional knowledge and they say, "Okay,
let's have a traditional knowledge conference and talk about what the treaty should
be." Even the World Intellectual Property Organization has split the discussion of
harmonized standards into two groups: one for TCE, one for traditional knowledge.
Hopefully, before any final decision is made on the protection regime for traditional
knowledge and TCE, the different groups will reconnect. Cross-communication
would be really helpful, because multi-fora discussions tend to promote people
running off into different rooms and never talking to each other again. While such
multi-fora standardization appears increasingly to be the norm in international IP
regimes, 19 without cross-communication, wonderfully conflicting standards that fail
to achieve any useful harmonization result. 20 Hopefully, when it comes to the issue
of international protection for traditional knowledge, the necessary paths of crosscommunication will remain open and productive.

educational usage, however, is strictly prohibited. Id.
Textiles Pty., Ltd., (1998) 41 IPR 513 (Austl.).

See also Bulun Bulun & Anor v. R & T

18 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 2; SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE?: APPROPRIATION AND

AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW (Rutgers Univ. Press) (2005) [herinafter Scafidi, Appropriation
and Authenticity];
TERRI JANKE, WIPO, INDIGENOUS ARTS CERTIFICATION MARK WIPO CASE
STUDY IN MINDING CULTURE (2003); Leannne Wiseman, The Protection of Indigenous Art and
Culture in Australia: The Label ofAuthenticity, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REPORTS, ISSUE 1
(2001); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Propertyand CulturalProducts, 81 B.U.L. REV. 793 (2001). See
also Doris Estelle Long, Presentation before the Syracuse 9th Annual Conference on The Association
For The Study Of Law, Culture and Humanities, Cultural Rights and the Diaspora: A Proposal
(March 17, 2006) (transcript on file with the author). See, e.g., Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting:
The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 29
YALE J. INT'L L. 1; Graeme Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporationof InternationalNorms
in the Formationof CopyrightLaw, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2000); Long, "Globalization'"supra note 2.
19 See, e.g., Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1; Graeme Dinwoodie, The
Development and IncorporationofInternationalNorms in the Formationof Copyright Law, 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Long, "Globalization'"supranote 2.
20 A good example is the arguable conflict between the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and TRIPS. Cross-communication during the development stages of the CBD might have
reduced the inter-treaty battles currently raging over the impact of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and agro-chemical inventions on sustainable development. See generally, Michael
Jeffery, "Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation:
Reconciling the
Incompatibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity,"
INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL

Academic Press) (2003).

RESOURCES (Burton Ong ed., Marshall

Cavendish
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In addition to the discussion of the protection of traditional knowledge under
current intellectual property regimes, one needs to consider other areas of impact as
well. One can deal with some of the traditional knowledge protection issues by
simply reconsidering and, potentially, reconfiguring the traditional treatment of
trademarks, collective rights, authentication, and collaborative creativity to reflect
traditional knowledge concerns.
One of the most difficult issues facing efforts to reconfigure copyright protection
to allow some form of traditional knowledge protection is the present dichotomy
between the individualistic authorship construct of present IP regimes and the
collective or tribal authorship of traditional arts. For many indigenous groups,
traditional knowledge, even in the form of folk art or other TCE's belongs to the
group, as a whole. There is no individual author; the group is the author and owns
the right to control such works. Such group authorship is not as radical or as
untenable within present copyright systems as it appears on its face. Whether one
calls it joint authorship or work for hire,21 the concept of collective authorship
already exists in IP rights regimes. Copyright law is already used to the idea that
there does not have to be an individual author for protection to exist. Thus, there
already are potential flexibilities on which one can rely as certain aspects of
traditional knowledge are incorporated into an intellectual property style regime.
We should also reconsider the copyright side of ideas relating to generational
use, generational creativity, and ideas about collaboration. While we reconsider
these ideas, it is helpful to remember that similar issues are present in the digital
world. Consider the debate over where to draw the boundaries on the protection of
derivative rights with respect to music sampling. 22 The emphasis on collaborative
creativity in much of traditional knowledge may provide helpful analogues in
reconfiguring the contested area of derivative works and fair use in the Digital Age.
I also believe that the concept of fair use itself can be expanded as we explore
other regimes and disciplines in our attempts to craft a workable international
traditional knowledge solution. Such expansion may occur as a result of increased
dialogues between IP rights, traditional knowledge, and human rights efforts to
protect culture.
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights recognizes that
"Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." 23 While the
IP right protection paradigm focuses on private rights, the Human Rights paradigm
has focused largely on communal rights. In fact, many of the human rights based
treaties dealing with cultural rights do not seek to establish rights to "protect"
culture per se, but instead use an education, self-determination, and collective

21 See generally 17 U.S.C §§ 101, 201 (defining work for hire, joint authorship, and
authorship). Soo also CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
22 Soo, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting to copyright owners the right to control the creation of

derivative works). See also Berne Convention, supra note 13, art.8. Compare Bridgeport Music Inc.
v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the unauthorized three note sample of
a sound recording qualified as infringing) with Newton v. Diamond and Others, 349 Fd.3 591 (9th
Cir. 2003) (noting that sample of flute is non-infringing).
2,3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 27, U.N. Doe. A/810 (Dec.
10, 1948).
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management model to give indigenous peoples a greater say in the uses of their
culture. 24 Many human rights advocates talk about collective rights. They focus on
group rights, which include self-determination and self-management for the group.
These perspectives may provide a better conceptual "fit" for the collective rights
based views of traditional knowledge holders.
The human rights advocates have also set up some interesting models for
dealing with dispute resolution without necessarily running into court. These models
utilize a mediation, as opposed to litigation, approach, the flexibilities of which can be
successfully adapted to the many contentious issues that must necessarily be part of
a workable traditional knowledge protection regime, including the fundamental
question of which group "owns" what traditional knowledge. By utilizing concepts
from traditional knowledge, access to knowledge, and consideration for human rights,
the flexible traditional knowledge protection system we develop should ultimately
contain a level of perceived fairness that will encourage greater participation and,
hopefully, encourage greater innovation. This new system will recognize the rights of
people who have been marginalized for a very long time and who, unfortunately, still
do not seem to have a voice.
Just as consideration of human rights concepts can be helpful in creating a
workable traditional knowledge protection system, valuable concepts can also be
obtained from consideration of the models coming from the access-to-knowledgeregime. In particular, some of the licensing models could be very helpful. 25 Creative
Commons and Open Source licensing models give individuals the right to control the
use of their works, while providing an easy model for granting largely unencumbered
rights. Such a model could be extremely useful for those kinds of traditional
knowledge where the holders are willing to allow non-deculturizing uses of their
traditional knowledge. Moreover, the ease of use of such models, where holders can
actually go to the site and pick the models that they want to adopt, might encourage
greater participation by indigenous and others in the system. In addition to royaltyfree distribution agreements, the access to knowledge dialogue also provides useful
models for protection regimes based on liability rules as opposed to a property based
system. 2 6 As noted earlier, for certain types of traditional knowledge for which

24

See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 27, (1976), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm; UNPO, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES, arts. 1, 5, 14-15 (2001) available at http://www.unpo.ee/en/rights/declaration.html;
INTERNATIONAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,

(1976),
available
at
COMMISSION
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN, art. 13 (1948) available at
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
25 See, e.g., Eric Kansa, Jason Schultz & Ahrash N. Bissell, Protecting TraditionalKnowledge
SOCIAL
AND
CULTURAL
RIGHTS,
arts.
1,
15
http ://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm;
INTER-AMERICAN

and Expanding Access to Scientific Data: JuxtaposingIntelleetual Property Agendas Via a "Some
Rights Reserved"Model, 12 INT'L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 285 (2005).
26 See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatenatable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000); Tracy Lewis & J.H. Reichman, "Using
Compensatory Liability Rules to Stimulate Innovation in Developing Countries," INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME (Keith Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds. Cambridge Univ. Press) (2005).
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commercialization is acceptable, it is possible that all we need are equitable benefit
sharing models for adoption.
Our next step in the process is to develop workable models and other soft laws to
help promote the types of protection that the diverse forms of traditional knowledge
require. Once we have developed these models, it will be easier for indigenous
groups to examine their own traditional knowledge and make informed decisions on
which uses they are willing to allow, and under which conditions. 27 It may well be
that once such a process is in place many of the concerns over reduction of the public
domain will prove evanescent. Traditional knowledge holders may elect to allow
28
uncompensated uses of their knowledge, so long as such uses are not deculturizing
29
and as long as the users properly identify the source of the knowledge at issue.
With the appropriate models in place, parties can obtain authentication and use
models from the access to knowledge arena, modify them, and devise a protection
system that may actually solve some of the present disputes over protection of
traditional knowledge.
Before I finish, I would like to discuss some of the tough issues that are still out
there. The first problem, obviously, is the definitional problem of what exactly
qualifies as protectable traditional knowledge. I believe that issue can eventually be
resolved, although we may not necessarily get it right the first time. One of the
things that I love about law is that if people do not get something right the first time,
they will just keep refining it and refining it until they do get it right. However, for
this trial and error process to work, we need enough minds in the room to make sure
that the definitions created are actually adequate to meet peoples' needs.
Furthermore, when talking about types of protectable "traditional" knowledge,
an interesting question arises: What happened to scientific knowledge?
What
happened to local knowledge? How should we treat the knowledge of non-indigenous
minority groups within a country (immigrants) who have specialized knowledge?
What happens to one's rights in traditional knowledge when an individual picks up
and leaves the group? Does the diaspora have the right to continue to use such
knowledge if an individual goes to another country, or if that person is outside the
physical boundaries of the group? What happens to those who are expulsed from the
group, or if over time, due to cultural, political or religious disagreements a group
separates?
There are many traditional knowledge debates right now where a border
between two countries places members of a group in two different states.
Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of work yet to be accomplished when it comes to
figuring out which group, if any, will be granted control over their traditional
knowledge, or how precisely to define such protected knowledge. However, I do not
think such tasks are insurmountable.
I also think people need to focus more on the type of access rights that are being
discussed, instead of simply drawing the border between TCEs and traditional

27 See, e.g., Riley, supra note 2.
28 For a brief discussion of deculturization

and its impact on traditional knowledge rights and
uses, see generally Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture:An
IntellectualPropertyPerspective,23 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 101 (1998).
29 See, e.g., Scafidi, Appropriation and Authenticity, supra note 18.
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knowledge and assuming that is the only relevant boundary that we need to consider.
To the contrary, we need to go beyond such simple categories and re-focus on the
broader public policy balances at the heart of the debate. We need to achieve more
dialogue across each of the regimes in order to end up with a system that is fair and
workable.
One of the positive developments in the nearly ten year international debates
over traditional knowledge is that individual countries are starting to provide sui
generous protection for domestic traditional knowledge. Countries such as New
Zealand, Panama and Peru, among others, have recognized that individual groups
should define which aspects of their traditional knowledge require protection. This
identification process is critical. Such identification, however, must be undertaken in
good faith. Understandably, some groups maintain that everything is a part of their
30
heritage and culture and should therefore be protected against unauthorized uses.
Such broad based claims are not only doomed to failure, they may well taint the
traditional knowledge protection process to such an extreme that no workable system
arises. If everything is protectable, then realistically nothing will be protected.
Many countries have actually established a registration system for traditional
knowledge, in which group holders are requested to indicate the items, practices, and
processes they are either willing to have licensed for use or are not willing to license
31
for any use at all.

Registration procedures admittedly present their own problems. One of the
obvious difficulties is the honest concern that if indigenous groups register the
practices, works, etc. that they do not want the public to use, those are precisely what
end up being the first items to be commercialized by third parties. Although, despite
these obvious limitations, at least a registration system, adequately funded and
supported so as to avoid any undue burden on indigenous groups, should help begin
the critical identification process. Whether traditional knowledge holders ultimately
decide to register those works for which no third party use would be granted, such as
in the case of sacred works, is less critical at this stage than that they begin the
process of deciding how to respond to the increasing requests (demands?) for access
to such knowledge.
At this stage, one of the remaining critical issues is the development of a
workable mediation system that both resolves disputes and maintains a level of
fairness to keep parties participating in the system. That is why I think the human
rights model and its dispute resolution system are so interesting. Any decision
regarding control over traditional knowledge should not be based on an adversarial
trial system. The idea is that two groups are making heartfelt, legitimate claims to a

'30 See Brown, supra note 2 (discussing distressing examples of the problems caused by overinclusive claims to traditional knowledge rights, including one intriguing claim to the kangaroo as
protectable traditional knowledge).
'31 See, e.g., Law Introducing A Protection Regime For The Collective Knowledge Of Indigenous
Peoples Derived From Biological Resources, Peru Law No. 27811, (2002), available at
http://www.grain.org/brl/?docid=81&lawid=2041; On The Special Intellectual Property Regime Upon
Collective Rights Of Indigenous Communities, For The Protection Of Their Cultural Identities And
Traditional
Knowledge,
Panama
Law
No.
20,
(2000),
available
at
http://www.grain.org/brl/?docid=461&lawid=2002; New Zealand Trademark Act, arts. 17(1), 177

(2002).
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right to control their perceived traditional knowledge. A method must be developed
following the mediation model that is used in connection with human rights issues, to
resolve such disputes in a balanced manner.
In addition to developing a workable mediation system for resolving traditional
knowledge disputes, we must also incorporate into the identification and licensing
processes the concept of fair-use and equitable access. I do not mean to suggest that
this fair use concept necessarily contains the same contours as the fair use doctrine
present in copyright regimes. 32 However, the basic premise of this doctrine, which
says that not everything gets protected on an exclusive basis and not every use that
may be useful for society is an automatic fair-use, is a concept of equitable access
that should apply with equal vigor in the context of traditional knowledge. When it
comes to traditional knowledge, it is critical to go back to the groups themselves and
say, "Think very hard about what it is you want to be certain that people do not use.
Think hard about what you are willing to let people use." As part of this deliberation
process, the default position should be in favor of the requested use. Adding the
concept that "it is better to share than not share," to the deliberative process should
help assure that use is only denied for a limited number of works and practices.
We need to have a balanced access paradigm. There will be some traditional
knowledge that is protected so strongly that the public may actually be denied any
use of such knowledge. 33 Ultimately, however, much traditional knowledge will
remain available on the basis of moderated access.
To achieve a balanced access paradigm, we need to begin to identify what factors
should be considered in deciding to grant or deny access to traditional knowledge.
These factors should be scrutinized and reviewed by all interested parties, including
indigenous groups. This list of factors would not be exclusive, but would hopefully
provide guidance to indigenous groups and predictability for third party users to
assure their utility. Ultimately, we need to realize that when dealing with access to
information, unimpeded access is not always right. Unbounded protection is also not
always right. However, in the case of traditional knowledge, the concerns and views
of the holders of such knowledge must be given precedence in order to give voice to
people who have largely been excluded from the process until now.
One of the articles that I am currently completing explores the imperialism of
the 19th century and the imperialism that is being applied to traditional knowledge
today. 34 The rhetoric of the two is frightening similar. We can avoid some of the
pitfalls of those earlier years if we consider diverse approaches. Access to knowledge,
human rights, intellectual property rights, etc. take the best of those approaches and
devise a regime that makes sense for all parties. I would hope, sixty-five years from
now, when we are all back here celebrating another anniversary for The John
Marshall Intellectual Property Law program, that we will have a regime that
actually makes sense for both the people who need access to traditional knowledge
'32 Soo, o.g., 17 USC § 107. Soo also Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Kelly v. Arriba, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Acuff-Rose v. Campbell, No. 91-5232, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6094 (6th Cir. April 1, 1991); Sony Corp. Of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
33 Sacred works and symbols are likely candidates for exclusion.
'3 Doris Estelle Long, Collaborativo Croativity and Collectivo Rights (working draft on file
with author).
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for commercialization purposes, and for the people whose traditional knowledge is
being commercialized.

